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Abstract
The self-declared state of Somaliland is much better known 
as a refugee producing territory than a refugee destination . 
Yet in recent years the territory has witnessed growing non-
Somali immigration from the Oromo regions of Ethiopia . 
In the wake of marginalization and oppression in Ethiopia, 
these newcomers find a precarious refuge in Somaliland, 
demonstrating some of the challenges of in-region protec-
tion and integration in the Horn of Africa .
Résumé
L’État non reconnu mondialement du Somaliland est 
mieux connu comme territoire producteur de réfugiés 
que destination pour ceux-ci . Pourtant, le Somaliland a 
vu ces dernières années une augmentation d’immigrants 
non somaliens provenant de l’Oromie en Éthiopie . Dans le 
sillage de leur marginalisation et oppression en Éthiopie, 
ces nouveaux arrivants trouvent un refuge précaire en 
Somaliland, démontrant certains des défis de la protection 
à l’intérieur de la région et de l’intégration dans la Corne 
de l’Afrique .
Somaliland, the de facto state on the northern periph-ery of the Horn of Africa, is best known as the site of mass emigration as a result of political oppression 
and civil war. In recent years, however, the territory has 
witnessed growing immigration. A significant proportion 
of Somaliland’s migrant population originate not from 
war-torn southern Somalia, but rather from various parts 
of Ethiopia. While an Ethiopian presence is not a new phe-
nomenon it has been increasingly noticeable in recent years 
as Somaliland has stabilized. Some of these immigrants 
work in Somaliland’s capital, Hargeisa, for the Ethiopian 
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mission, businesses, or NGOs, and some fled to Somaliland 
since 2007 in the wake of the Ethiopian government’s brutal 
counter-insurgency campaign in the Ogaden region. This 
account, however, focuses on a third group, exploring the 
fortunes of people of Oromo origin living in Somaliland. 
The Oromo are the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, but 
have found themselves marginalized from power under 
successive regimes, most recently by the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which came to 
power following the 1991 revolution which brought down 
the authoritarian Derg regime. Political and economic 
oppression in the Oromia region, following the withdrawal 
of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) from the Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia in 1992, have forced unknown 
numbers to leave the country.
Most research in the last twenty years on Ethiopian 
refugees has focused on large refugee camp populations in 
Djibouti, Sudan, and Kenya and the major resettled popu-
lations in North America and Europe. There is a dearth of 
information on the situation of the many Oromos living in 
the Somali regions. Indeed, for outsiders, it is often hard to 
believe that anyone would seek refuge in the Somali terri-
tories, which in the last two decades have been much better 
known for producing than hosting refugees. Their presence 
has recently been brought to international attention as a 
result of transit migration and boat smuggling to Yemen—
although many are not in transit, but have been living in 
the Somali regions for several years. Recent research by the 
Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University1 in Hargeisa, 
Somaliland, offers some insights into the situation of this 
population and the challenges they face, drawing on twelve 
individual interviews and group discussions with some 
twenty-five people, carried out with the help of two Oromo-
speaking research assistants in July 2008, as well as consul-
tations with NGO workers, UNHCR, government officials, 
business people, and other local residents.
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Causes of Migration
Despite initial high hopes, ethnic federalism initiated by 
the EPRDF is now thought by some analysts to have failed 
to accommodate grievances, while promoting ethnic–self 
awareness among all groups of Ethiopians.2 According to 
Oromo research participants, their problems in fact escalated 
following the 1991 revolution. Most directly, they described 
a climate of fear and repression, claiming that the govern-
ment and regional authorities used accusations of links to 
the OLF to justify a range of repressive measures, including 
extrajudicial killings, detentions without trial, and harass-
ment of people publicly expressing criticism of government 
policies and of their families.3 A minority of our research 
participants volunteered the information that they had sup-
ported the OLF concretely in some way, and many more said 
that more broadly there was considerable resentment and 
politicization among their communities as a result of their 
treatment at the hands of the authorities.
The research participants also described other treatment 
by state officials that they saw as intended to disempower 
their communities. Among them were people of poor as 
well as relatively prosperous backgrounds, and they had 
previously engaged in a range of occupations—working 
as traders, farmers, herders, students, and casual labour-
ers. They emphasized the natural wealth of the areas they 
live in, but were frustrated by what they saw as undermin-
ing economic measures, such as the debt relations resulting 
from the distribution of fertilizers on credit by local officials 
and the selective authorization and withholding of trading 
licences. The prohibition on using the Oromo language in 
many areas of public life was lifted by the EPRDF, but par-
ticipants asserted that the repressive political climate and 
the introduction of new and intrusive local institutions (sup-
posedly as a means of promoting community development) 
had deliberately disrupted patterns of trust and mutual sup-
port in their communities.
Various factors triggered the departure of those inter-
viewed. Most had left in the run-up to the 2005 elections 
and since, when there was a surge in Oromo arrivals in 
Somaliland. Many cited examples of close relatives who had 
been killed or imprisoned. Many had been imprisoned them-
selves, and subjected to torture and inhuman treatment. A 
significant proportion had been high school or university 
students and had been caught up in the waves of surveil-
lance, expulsions, and arrests that followed various student 
demonstrations. The general pattern was that they had left 
alone, secretly, and often precipitously—following detention, 
a traumatic event, or threat from officials—with the primary 
aim of getting out of Ethiopia. Most said that they had come 
to Somaliland simply because it was close, without knowing 
much about the situation there. This picture contrasts with 
the commonly held view in Somaliland that the Oromos are 
economic migrants. Reportedly some people from Oromia 
do travel to Somaliland primarily to work for a few months 
or years, but none of the people participating in this research 
said that they had left Ethiopia to find work. Rather they 
emphasized that they had reluctantly left behind families, 
fertile lands, university careers, or business interests, in the 
face of what they felt was considerable personal danger, for 
an economically dismal existence in Somaliland.
Situations in Somaliland
People originating from the Oromo region are gener-
ally among the poorest of poor in Somaliland. They are 
effectively restricted to the worst-paid jobs, jobs which 
Somalilanders find demeaning, such as rubbish collection, 
toilet digging and emptying, clothes washing, and other 
casual work. They are criticized for begging with their chil-
dren, something seen by locals as alien and shameful. Some 
are able to find work as watchmen but generally on lower 
pay than locals. Stories of abusive employers abound: most 
commonly, research participants reported problems with 
getting paid for work they had done, some saying that their 
employer threatened to report them to the Ethiopian mis-
sion and the Somaliland criminal investigation department 
to make them give up for fear of deportation.
Community relations are generally rather segregated, due 
to the language barrier, distinct culture, and belief among 
many locals that the Oromos are Christian (although many 
coming to Somaliland are in fact Muslim). As non-Somalis, 
they fall outside the Somali clan arbitration system, and 
have struggled to resolve disputes with members of the 
host community. Recognizing the way things work locally, 
a committee of Oromo elders was established, with the 
approval of the Ministry for the Interior, to try to represent 
their interests, but has struggled to be taken seriously by 
Somali elders. The suicide bombings of the Ethiopian mis-
sion, United Nations Development Programme offices, and 
the Presidential Palace, and a subsequent backlash against 
“foreigners,” including Oromos, in Somaliland, did not 
make things any easier.
A Precarious Refuge?
Somaliland itself has undergone massive political upheaval 
in the last thirty years. Growing resistance to Siyad Barre’s 
regime culminated in the civil war of 1988–1991. During 
the 1990s, despite a relapse to conflict mid-decade, a polit-
ical system was gradually established that has since ensured 
stability and peace. But the Somaliland government has 
not been recognized internationally, and has recently come 
under major political strain regarding disagreements over 
the much-delayed presidential elections. Oromo research 
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participants emphasized the poverty of Somaliland—one 
describing the position of immigrants as: “It is like leading 
the life of a watchman of another watchman.”
Nevertheless, legally speaking, insofar as it governs 
the population in areas where it has effective control, the 
Somaliland government is bound by customary inter-
national human rights law.4 Moreover, under Article 10 of 
its constitution, Somaliland has committed to international 
obligations entered into by the Republic of Somalia, includ-
ing the 1951 and 1969 Refugee Conventions. Specifically, 
Article 35(1) of the Somaliland constitution specifically 
grants foreign citizens the right to seek political asylum.
An asylum system has been established, administered by 
a Refugee Eligibility Committee under the Ministry of the 
Interior, working in co-operation with UNHCR. All this 
is rather remarkable progress, given the precarious polit-
ical and economic situation of Somaliland. However, early 
reports of corruption and lack of capacity led to the suspen-
sion of registration (with the interim measure of large-scale 
registration exercises) pending an overhaul of the system, 
which reopened in 2008. In 2008, Somaliland had some 
six thousand registered asylum seekers and well over one 
thousand recognized refugees, mainly Ethiopian Oromos. 
Refugees were given a recognition letter and were able to 
claim a US$50 allowance each month from UNHCR. For 
reasons already mentioned, the prospects for local integra-
tion are deemed slim and some have been resettled in third 
countries. But a large proportion of Oromos in Somaliland 
are not registered as asylum seekers, either because they sim-
ply want to work, or through fear, poverty, or ignorance.
However, the protection of Ethiopian nationals seeking 
refuge in Somaliland is at best patchy. There have been num-
erous reports of deportations or attempted deportations of 
Ethiopians from Somaliland, including some of our Oromo 
research participants and people they had known person-
ally.5 Many of the participants lived in fear of deportation, 
and several explained that they moved frequently around 
the city to avoid detection. According to international con-
ventions which Somaliland has committed to honour, asy-
lum seekers and refugees should be protected from return 
to a country where their life or freedom may be threatened. 
Moreover, according to Article 35(3) of the constitution, for-
eign citizens in general can only be extradited where a formal 
extradition treaty exists: according to Human Rights Watch 
no such treaty can exist with Ethiopia, as it does not recog-
nize Somaliland’s independence.6 However, the Somaliland 
authorities can come under considerable political pressure 
to be co-operative, or at least not obstructive: Ethiopia is the 
regional superpower and Somaliland’s major regional ally, 
and the government is highly dependent on revenue from 
Berbera Port and the trade corridor into Ethiopia.
It is hard for many Oromos in Somaliland to access 
any kind of assistance. Compatriots are sometimes able to 
offer some help, but they are generally struggling to survive 
themselves. NGOs are generally not particularly interested 
in assisting non-Somalis, given the major issues facing many 
local people. As one interviewee put it, “There are many 
NGOs in this country. But it is impossible to approach them 
because the local community won’t allow you. You have to 
pass many hedges to get them.” In this context, the UNHCR, 
the Refugee Welfare Centre (run by Save the Children and 
funded by UNHCR), the Refugee Committee, and the 
Hargeisa University Legal Clinic (funded by UNDP) provide 
crucial if limited support. More generally, the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) has been trying to sensi-
tize local communities to the rights and needs of migrants, 
particularly those on the move through Somaliland.
With problems in Ethiopia ongoing, and many lacking 
the funds to move any further than Somaliland, the Oromo 
presence in Somaliland is likely to continue. There are 
children born in dire poverty to Oromo parents, who are 
unlikely to “return” to Ethiopia. While many in Somaliland 
may not yet be willing to contemplate the idea, alongside 
the territory’s many other challenges, people of Oromo ori-
gin are likely to continue to form a permanent minority in 
Somaliland in the long run, and deserve to live in dignity.
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 5. See also Human Rights Watch, “Hostages to Peace”; also 
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